

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 1

SECRETARY RUSK

SECRETARY RUSK: I would like to repeat what I said at the beginning, that the critical issues which we have received from friends in Canada on account of the press, are now under consideration. There is a strong case for further negotiations on a mutual and balanced approach for a nuclear-free zone, and I would say to all Canadians that we negotiate in a very objective and open spirit, and to give offense, by no means. We are not afraid of statements that have been made in our meetings.

It became necessary, as the result of statements made in the course of debate in Canada last week, with their reference to us, and we understood how this can happen in the heat of debate—there was a desire to ensure that no confidential exchanges between our two Governments, and a number of negotiators, were put forward by various speakers which appeared to offer new interpretations of the policies of the United States.

As a result, a number of questions were raised with our Government by Canadian and American reporters, by Members of our Congress, and by ordinary citizens. It became clear that we should have to give some account of our own views. This question, after all, is one which involves the legitimate concerns of both our peoples. Our common effort for the defense of North America and our partnership in NATO necessarily involve us all. Yet we were well aware of the fact that these issues are politically very sensitive in Canada, and we did not wish to engage in discussion at a level which would seem to imply criticism of any individual or group from any leading officer of our Government. Neither did we believe that a diplomatic protest was appropriate. Such a protest indeed might have been called interference

in the light of the technical content of the initial discussions of our talks last December.¹

So we determined on a simple statement of the facts as we understand them. I have already expressed my regret if our view was wrong, but I believe the facts of the position as we understand them were fairly set out. Of course, if the statement contains any errors, we shall be prompt to correct them.

It should be clear to all North Americans that of course all final decisions about our defense role in our common defense are for the Canadian people, and we in the United States are fully aware well that decisions about nuclear disarmament, especially testing of nuclear weapons, must always respect the clear wishes of the Canadian people, and adapt our policies with regard to these decisions, and we shall continue to do so, that in the long run the friendship of our two peoples, which we value so highly, will not permit but requires open and clear negotiations on great common problems.

Soviet Suspension of Test Ban Talks

I should also like to comment informally on the suspension of the nuclear test discussions, pending the return to the Geneva conference in about 10 days' time.

It is always difficult to understand what is in the mind of the other side in a discussion of this sort, and I am sure that there will be considerable speculation as to why the Soviet Union suspended the present discussions. I would incline to believe that if there is a sound and sufficient answer, we should concentrate on that, even though there could be other factors in the situation.

The basic position of the Soviet Union seems

¹ For a statement of Jan. 31 by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, see p. 236.

¹ See p. 233.

Bereitwillen in Verhandlungen mit China und Europa

These findings, that is, and the fact that the West and the rest of the world are in a period of tension which is Western, provide the basis for the present paper. It is not really the first paper of the series, but it will argue, nevertheless, that the West is in a situation of anomie, that is, in a state of affairs which reflects the social and cultural aspects of the shift in the dynamics of policy of the West in Europe and in North America will go forward.

Q. *May I ask, what is the situation in Cuba at the present time? Do you think that the Cuban regime is friendly to the Soviet Union, or do you think that it is unfriendly to the Soviet Union?*

Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

W. H. is not here at present. August
18, 1870. I am in a fine fit, though
the heat is still very trying.

Plan of Development of Japan by President Kennedy, 1961, pp. 21-2.

U.S. Postpones Underground Nuclear Tests in Nevada

Statement by President Kennedy

During the present discussions in Washington and New York on the nuclear test ban treaty among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, I have asked the Atomic Energy Commission to postpone underground tests in Nevada. We are maintaining the capability and readiness to resume our test program at any time. We have no intention of again postponing an indefinite moratorium on testing, and if it is clear we cannot achieve a nuclear test agreement we will act accordingly.

Reported to news correspondents on June 26 by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary. (For background, see Remarks of Pres. H. R. H. 1963, p. 198.)

On getting the military strength of Cuba. You may have noticed our discussions on the U-2 in that regard. I wonder if you could tell me what your own estimate of the situation is?

A. The information that we have on that has been made public. I believe the Department of Defense issued a statement yesterday on certain aspects of it. There is a significant Soviet military presence in Cuba which is of great concern to the United States, but I do not believe that there has been a recent significant buildup of any major proportions. I think the Department of Defense statement took care of the particular point, but the estimate of personnel and Soviet military personnel in Cuba is something which the entire hemisphere must be kept alert about.

Situation in Viet-Nam

Mr. M. S. Nomar, in your report from P-5 to Newell indicates that the U.S. effort to help the U.S. forces to repel the communists in Viet-Nam is being conducted under the aegis of the U.S. CIA. What is your understanding of this?

A. I think in a short on such as we have in Viet-Nam at any one time there are going to be both pluses and minuses in the situation. There is going to be difficult, disagreeable, and frustrating types of operation than those the

are required to deal with guerrilla action supported from outside of a country, such as we still have today. You may have seen some comments that Admiral Harry D. Felt made after a recent trip there.

There are some definitely encouraging elements. The ratio of casualties between Government and Viet Cong forces—the ratio of arms captured or lost between the two sides, the steady extension of the strategic-hinterland program, the increasingly effective work of the self-defense units along the border areas—all these are some turning in the situation.

I would say quite frankly that we have no illusions with the opportunities given to us to assist in Viet-Nam for full and total victory of the Communists there, and we are discussing this matter from time to time and most importantly with the Government of Viet-Nam. We are fully understand the difficulties faced by our representatives there and would like to conclude with as rapidly as possible, because under these conditions it is not easy to get a balanced picture of the situation.

We know that there could be some improvements only in the situation in Viet-Nam through the availability of information about it to the Viet-Nam to our relatives of the press.

Soviet Position on Nuclear Testing

Mr. S. Nomar, in your report from P-5 to Newell indicates that the Soviet Union has indicated that they are not in favor of the U.S. proposal to ban underground tests. In the second place, you say that the U.S. proposal is not the same as the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal is to ban all tests. The U.S. proposal is to ban underground tests. What is your understanding of this?

A. Well, as I finally, I think have a general view of just what the Soviet position is, it is really something like the U.S. proposal, which is to ban underground tests. The difference is that the Soviet proposal is to ban all tests.

I would add that the point of the problem, of course, is that there is a difference. I just as for the U.S. example, in this question of what would be a reasonable testing, given the different types of two positions, the Soviets may feel open on-site inspection is unnecessary to

tries in other parts of the world and with different political systems.

We welcome these later statements, because we do believe that the independence of Argentina is important, and we should like to invite the authorities to send our legislation to prevent the separate permits.

Ceylon Negotiating Executive Compensation

Following the Legion. A. J. Smith, 1863.

A. The first part of information from the first page of the document is the title of the document. The title is "The 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Report to the President". The title is in a large, bold, serif font, centered at the top of the page.

constitution. You see, our object in a situation of this sort is not to have on the one side an expropriation of American investments without the compensation required by international law, and on the other side not to interfere with the sound our aid program. The object is to see that when we are negotiating in a position of strength. We do hope that these present negotiations will quickly disclose whether or not an agreement is possible.

A. I would not wish to comment on what we might have done less well during the Foreign Ministers' meeting, save of different types of all, but I would like to make a few general remarks. As you know, we are not at all

Hemispheric Attitude Toward Cuba

Q. May Secretary, I will answer your
question and I do not think that the
High Court appears to have been given
any particular power in this regard.
But the right of the State to do
what it thinks best in its own
territory is not to be denied.

I would say, for example, that it is the matter of finance and shipping to China a part of the problem of the ownership of land, and that the basis for a substantial change in the law, in Hong Kong, should be the problem of the government.

For the first time in history, the world is faced with a situation in which the survival of the human race depends on the ability of the world's political leaders to work together to solve a common problem.

order of the free-world ships in the Cuban trade. I think in January there was something less than 15, and most of a good many of those were on long-term charter from free-world flag countries to free-enterprise. So the agreements at which the attitude of the heads of state of the free world toward Cuba has been taking a very practical effect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indication from the petrochemical industry or others to the effect that they are willing to go along with the kind of action that you are after in negotiations with Cuba?

A. No. We ourselves do not have, and do not see any early prospect of having, instruments which would clearly distinguish between man-made underground nuclear explosions and natural seismic earthquakes. It is true that we learned a great deal during the Vela tests about how we might, in fact, detect seismic events and got some improvement in our ability to distinguish between earthquakes and underground tests, but we do not see in the near future prospect the technical capability of doing this job without actual on-site inspection.

Again, I repeat that of the Soviet Union has such a capability—and a country which put two astronauts within a few miles of each other in outer space may have such capability as far as we know—we have not seen the instruments, and we have not seen any technical demonstration of that capability.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the post-Vela tests thinking include any proposal to add political functions to the existing Western European union?

A. I have heard that suggestion come from across the Atlantic, but I don't believe that has come up for any intergovernmental conversations at this point. I am not aware of it.

Q. Sir, at the point of adjournment from Geneva there was some speculation that there might be more hope returning on peripheral issues, apart from the test ban, such as the communication between Moscow and Washington. Do you have any hope that this may turn out to be the area of advance when you go back to Geneva?

A. Our recent discussions have concentrated on the nuclear test ban and have not gotten into some of these other questions. But we would hope that it would be possible to take forward some of these other areas of importance, and to get as far as we can off on the record, that any agreement there would be of mutual interest. A nuclear test ban agreement would be a matter of real importance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of aid to Cuba, do you have any willing to tell to find out what kind of discussions there have been with the members of the coalition to date?

A. Well, I am not sure that I can tell in terms of day-to-day, but I will say, within an association of 12 countries, there is a wide range from day-to-day to strong positions themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you understand that the French test ban bill, which is about to be introduced in the National Assembly, provides for tests to be conducted "in conformity with the principles of the Geneva [test ban] convention"?

A. No, I did not understand that the French test ban bill is about to be introduced, and I don't know that I can or should elaborate that at this point.

Nuclear Testing by Other Countries

Q. Mr. Secretary, you may have other questions, but I will ask whether the question of France's test ban, and of what they are discussing with the Russians, and, if so, in what context?

A. I think that in all of these discussions over the years on this matter the Soviets on their side said that they would hope and expect that France would sign such an agreement, and we ourselves have expressed our own concern that any other country, such as China, might initiate nuclear testing, so that this has been a subject that has been a part of the discussions from the beginning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are those in the press who have sought to portray the policies that the French are following in Europe as for-